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JURY-BASHING AND THE OJ. SIMPSON
VERDICT
GERALD F. UELMEN"
From the perspective of public opinion, the biggest loser in
the trial of People v. O.J. Simpson1 was not the prosecution. It was
notJudge Ito. It was the jury.
A survey recently done in a judicial district in Los Angeles
asked respondents to rate the performance of the various
participants in the OJ. Simpson trial. The pool surveyed was
very conservative. They identified themselves as 55%
Republican; 59% "conservative," and 15% "very conservative."'
When asked whether they agreed or disagreed with the
statement that California should make convicted criminals do
manual labor in chain-gangs, 74% expressed agreement.'
This is how those survey respondents rated the performance
of the Simpson trial participants: Judge Ito, 70% good or
excellent; Marcia Clark, 79% good or excellent; Johnny
Cochran, 58% good or excellent; the jury, 30% good or
excellent."
These results demonstrate the perils befalling a jury that
follows instructions. Following instructions has always been a
perilous venture for a jury. There is an honorable and long
tradition of jury-bashing in American history. A dramatic
example dates back to 1882 in Cincinnati.6 When a young
* Professor of Law, Santa Clara University School of Law. Professor Uelmen served as
co-counsel for the defense in People v. O.J. Simpson. His account of the trial was
published as GERALD F. UELMEN, LESSONS FROM THE TRIAL: PEOPLE V. OJ. SIMPSON
(1996).
1. People v. OJ. Simpson, No. BA 097211 (Cal. Super. CL, LA. County) (Oct. 3,
1995), available inWESTLAW, Notable Trials Library, OJ-TRANS.
2. See A Survey of the Citrus Municipal Court Distict (Nat'l Demographics Corp.,
Claremont, California),January 18-19, 1996, at tbls.2-6.
3. See id. at tbls.53-54.
4. See id. at tbl.34.
5. See id. at tbls.2-4, 6.
6. See, e.g., Gerald F. Uelmen, William Howard Taft, Jury Basher LOS ANGELES DAILYJ.,
Nov. 6, 1995, at 4. All the information in this and the following two paragraphs can be
found in this article.
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stablehand who was put on trial for strangling his boss was
found guilty of manslaughter instead of murder, there was a
huge demonstration. A large crowd went to the music hall,
where the judge of the Superior Court for that county in Ohio
exhorted the assembled throng to drive from the community
the jury that had returned that unpopular verdict, as well as the
defense lawyer who had asked for it. The crowd then went to the
jail, where they sought to lynch the defendant. They were driven
away and then proceeded to burn down the courthouse. Then
occurred a Cincinnati riot in which forty-five people were killed.
A subsequent grand jury investigation looked into the
incident, and the grand jury concluded the real fault did not lay
with the judge who exhorted the crowd, or with the newspapers
that fanned the excitement. The real problem lay with the jury
that returned a reprehensible verdict, and with the defense
lawyer who argued for it. A young assistant prosecutor then led
an unsuccessful effort to get that lawyer disbarred.
Incidentally, the name of that defense lawyer was Tom
Campbell, and those riots in Cincinnati were known as the Tom
Campbell riots. The young prosecutor who sought to get Tom
Campbell disbarred was William Howard Taft, providing a
wonderful example of how jury-bashing and criminal defense
lawyer-bashing can lay the foundations for a spectacular political
7
career.
It is true that even defense lawyers occasionally join in and
bash verdicts they don't agree with. For example, regarding the
verdict in the first Menendez trial, Alan Dershowitz said: "What I
am criticizing is the foolish juries who fall for the sob stories told
by the lawyers., 8 I myself have fallen prey to this temptation.
After the first Rodney King verdict, I wrote, "Apparently, it was
easy to convince ajury of white suburbanites to disconnect their
eyeballs from their brains and not be satisfied with seeing."9
Upon rereading those words, I was reminded of the Latin
7. William Howard Taft served as the youngest Solicitor General in American history,
and was appointed ChiefJudge of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit at the
age of 35. After service as Theodore Roosevelt's Secretary of War, he was elected
President of the United States in 1908. He also served as Chief Justice of the United
States from 1921 to 1930. See 4 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF THE AMERICAN PRESIDENCY, 1427 (Levy
& Fisher eds., 1994).
8. ALAN M. DERSHOWrrz, THE ABUSE EXCUSE 28 (1994).
9. Gerald F. Uelmen, Need for Civilian Police Review Revisited, LOS ANGELEs DAILYJ., May
15, 1992, at4.
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maxim "verba volant scripta manent"-oral words fly away, but
written words remain to haunt you. Some may suggest that I lack
standing to protest the bashing that the Simpson jury has taken,
because I have engaged in jury-bashing myself. Nonetheless, I
feel compelled to respond to some of the less-informed criticism
of the Simpson jury.
Recently, in California, we were treated to what has become
an annual spectacle, the unveiling of a new initiative measure to
cure instantly all of the ills of the criminal justice system. That
year's initiative was called "The Public Safety Protection Act of
1996," and its chief feature was the abolition of the requirement
of unanimity in criminal jury trials."0 This initiative would have
allowed a verdict to be returned by a vote of ten of the twelve
jurors, except in death penalty cases. Trotted out as the poster
boy, at the press conference announcing this new initiative, was
Fred Goldman."
This was deja vu for Californians, because the poster boys for
the three-strikes-and-you're-out initiative were the family of Polly
Klaas.' The Klaases later opposed the measure, after realizing
they were being used to promote a measure that really did not
address the problem with which they were concerned.'3
No one really explained the connection between Fred
Goldman and a proposal to abolish unanimity in California jury
trials. There also seemed to be little obvious connection to the
Simpson trial. The chief criticism of the Simpson jury was that it
did not deliberate long enough. If this measure had been in
effect, the jury would have reached a verdict in ten minutes
instead of four hours 4 because the jury would not even have had
to listen to the initial doubts of two of their fellow jurors after
the first vote was taken. If we truly value deliberation, then we
should seek to encourage jurors to listen to the concerns and
doubts expressed by minority jurors, rather than seeking to
10. The Initiative sponsors announced in February, 1996, that they had been unable
to collect sufficient signatures to qualify the measure for the ballot. See Cris Arguedas,
CACJ Wins july Battle, 23 CAGJ FORUM 5 (1996).
11. See Goldman Calls for Changes in Criminal Juy Law, WASH. POST, Nov. 17, 1995, at
A16 (noting Goldman's support for the proposed initiative). Fred Goldman is the father
of Ronald Goldman, who was murdered in 1994 along with O.J. Simpson's ex-wife. See id.
12. Polly Klaas, a twelve-year-old girl, was in 1993 kidnapped from her own home and
then killed by a repeat violent felon. See Bill Ainsworth, Three Strikes Spokesman Has
Change of Heart, LEGAL TIMES, Apr. 4, 1994, at 7.
13. Seeid.
14. See The Simpson Verdicts: The Case, by the Numbers, LA. TIMES, Oct. 4, 1995, atA10.
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permit an instant verdict to be filed over the objections of two of
the jurors.
The foregoing objection does not mean there was no
connection between the Simpson case and this proposal.
Indeed, there was a connection, but it was much more subtle.
The connection was the growing power of minority jurors and
the fear of that power by the white majority. That connection
was made the day after the Simpson verdict was announced; it
was made in The Wall Street Journal which ran a lead story under
the headline: "Color Blinded."'"
The story in question was not overtly a story about the 0J.
Simpson verdict, but no one could read it without making the
obvious connection. The story reported that race was playing an
increasing role injury verdicts around the country and that this
phenomenon fit neatly into a tradition of political activism by
U.S. juries. 6 An acquittal rate of 47.6% for black defendants in
the Bronx was attributed to the fact that juries there are 80%
black.17 The article concluded that this phenomenon may reflect
an increase in 'jury nullification" by black juries, reporting:
"Some jury nullification advocates now say blacks are justified in
using their jury room vote to fight what they perceive as a
national crisis: a justice system that is skewed against them by
courts, prosecutors, and racist police such as former Los Angeles
Detective Mark Fuhrman.' 8
However, the verdict in the case of People v. O.J. Simpson was
not jury nullification. Those who suggest it was simply have not
listened to the jurors' explanation of their verdict.'9 Shortly after
the verdict, one of the jurors said "she thought 0J. 'probably
did it,' but she understood that 'probably' wasn't good enough,
that she had to be convinced beyond a reasonable doubt.""0
What a wonderful affirmation that a juror could understand so
clearly and follow so faithfully the instructions of the court. The
verdict was a vindication of the principle that guilt must be
proven beyond a reasonable doubt.
15. Benjamin A. Holden, Laurie P. Cohen, & Eleena de Liser, Color Blinded? Race




19. SeeAMANDA COoLEY, CARRIE BEss, & MARSHA RUBIN-JACKSON, MADAM FOREMAN: A
RUSH TOJUDGMENT? (1995).
20. UELMEN, supra note *, at 180.
(Vol. 20
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Now, did the racial composition of the jury affect their
assessment of reasonable doubt? Of course it did. Every defense
lawyer knows that factors such as race, religion, gender, and life
experience of the jurors will affect how they assess reasonable
doubt, and those factors become especially important when
assessing the credibility of police officers. No matter what color
a client is, a defense lawyer working on a case involving police
perjury will want as many black jurors as possible, and the
prosecution will want as many white jurors as possible. That is
not jury nullification, it is common sense. Similarly, the verdict
of the Simi Valley jurors in the Rodney King beating case was
not white jury nullification. It was simply white reasonable
doubt.
This argument may lead some to conclude that lawyers should
not be allowed to affect the racial composition of juries by
means of peremptory challenges-i.e., that we should abolish
peremptory challenges. That argument is worth discussing, but
it has little to do with the Simpson case. What is frequently
overlooked about the Simpson case is that, when both sides
stood up and announced that they accepted the jury that had
been selected, neither side had exercised all of its peremptory
challenges. The prosecution had exercised only ten of its twenty
peremptory challenges, although it had used eight of those ten
challenges to excuse African-American jurors. The defense had
exercised only nine of its twenty peremptory challenges,
excusing five whites, one African-American, one Hispanic, and
21two Native Americans.
The diversity of the Simpson jury had nothing to do with
peremptory challenges or with the use of jury consultants, for
that matter. It had more to do with where the trial was held. The
most vigorous criticism of the Los Angeles County District
Attorney in the wake of the verdict attacked his failure to move
the trial to Santa Monica or the San Fernando Valley, where the
jury would have been less diverse. Interestingly, his predecessor
as District Attorney was criticized precisely because he did move
the Rodney King case to the Simi Valley. But gerrymandering a
trial's location to affect the racial composition is not called
"playing a race card" in Los Angeles.
21. See UELMEN, supra note *, at 86; see also Andrea Ford & Jim Newton, 12 Simpson
Jurors are Sworn In, Los ANGELES TIMEs, Nov. 4, 1994, at Al.
479
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It is also interesting that Batson v. Kentucky2 really has little
impact on the prosecutorial use of race as a factor in jury
selection, and it will have even less effect after the ruling this
Term that the explanation for the prosecutor's peremptory
challenge does not even have to be a plausible explanation.2
Any prosecutor with a little imagination can come up with a
race-neutral reason for striking a black juror.
The prize ought to go to the Virginia prosecutor who, asked
to explain why he excused an African-American man, explained
that it was because the man showed evidence of an undesirable
"sympathetic disposition." The evidence was the fact that he was
wearing a crucifix around his neck, and the Virginia Supreme
Court upheld that as a race-neutral explanation for the exercise
of a peremptory challenge.
Is the solution to all of this simply to abolish peremptory
challenges? If we could come up with a uniform and fair system
of challenges for cause, an abolition of peremptory challenges
would be an improvement. The problem is that most judges
apply a ludicrous standard in a challenge for cause. They simply
let the jurors themselves be the final arbiter of whether or not
they are biased. For example, some judges conduct voir dire
examinations by walking into the courtroom and asking, "Are
any of you here biased against African-Americans? If you are,
would you please raise your hand?"
In a recent Louisiana Supreme Court decision, the court held
that a judge was not required to excuse a juror for cause who
had gone to the funeral home to visit the murder victim's body
and who was employed as a prison guard, because she assured
the trial court of her impartiality. 6 In another case, a North
Carolina judge allowed a prosecutor to sit on ajury, despite the
fact that he worked in the same D.A.'s office as the prosecutor
trying the case, because he told the judge he could overcome
22. 476 U.S. 79 (1986) (holding race-based peremptory challenges unconstitutional).
23. See Purkett v. Elem, 115 S. Ct. 1769, 1771 (1995) (holding that so long as the
proponent of a peremptory challenge can produce a facially valid justification-one that
need not be even "minimally persuasive"-the burden returns to the opponent of the
strike to show impermissible racial motivation).
24. SeeJames v. Commonwealth, 442 S.E.2d 396 (Va. 1994).
25. Personal observation of the author.
26. See State v. Jones, 474 So. 2d 919 (La. 1985) (upholding a conviction of first-
degree murder and finding no error in trial judge's denial of a challenge for cause of a
juror who had viewed the victim's body).
[Vol. 20
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the difficulty of remaining objective.27 If this kind of standard is
applied in challenges for cause, peremptory challenges are
needed as a safety valve to ensure that biased jurors are actually
excused from sitting onjuries.
Americans are free to accept or reject the verdict of any jury,
and apparently felt no reluctance to do so in the case of People v.
O.J. Simpson. But disagreement with a verdict rendered in good
faith by those who patiently sat and listened to all the evidence
does notjustify publicly bashing the jurors and accusing them of
being racists or ignoramuses. If anything will discourage citizens
from responding to a summons to perform their civic duty to
serve on juries, it is the prospect of their fellow citizens engaging
in the American sport ofjury-bashing.
27. See State v. Scales, 443 S.E.2d 124 (N.C. Ct. App. 1994) (upholding burglary
conviction and finding no error in a trial judge's denial of a challenge for cause of a
juror who was a member of the district attorney's staff, because the juror said he would
be able to follow the law).
No. 2]
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